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1 Introduction 
1.1 Informal practices as drivers of corruption: Rationale and conceptual approach 
The lack of effectiveness of conventional anti-corruption interventions has been convincingly 
documented (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011) and is reflected in the so-called implementation gap, whereby 
countries that have adopted the legal and organizational reforms associated with anti-corruption best 
practices continue to experience very high levels of corruption. This situation appears to be linked to 
a lack of empirical support for the assumption that corruption is a consequence of weaknesses arising 
in the context of a principal-agent model of accountability, which presumes the existence of “principled 
principals” capable of and willing to enforce the anti-corruption reforms. In response, scholars have 
sought to re-frame endemic corruption as indicative of an underlying collective action problem 
(Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). A problem so far with this latter approach 
is that, while it can describe why in some contexts corruption has been extremely hard to eradicate, it 
has not delivered clear recommendations on how anti-corruption practitioners might do things 
differently.  
We argue that bringing in the importance and impact of informal practices into the debate helps to 
overcome the limitations of the principal-agent and collective action approaches. Adopting an 
informality lens brings to the fore those motivations and patterns of behaviour that are rarely explicitly 
articulated or taken into account in formal policy making but are nonetheless widely known and 
observed by the insiders in any given context. Therefore, this line of research has potential towards 
delivering insights about previously unaccounted drivers of corruption that are useful for purposes of 
policy making. 
This report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of 
the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. The project has 
identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific 
features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their 
respective economies and indicate the extent to which they underpin corruption and affect 
anticorruption policies. The comparative research design involves seven countries from two 
geopolitical groups East Africa and Post-Soviet countries as follows: 
• East Africa: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda  
• Post-Soviet countries: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
The goal of the research is to produce evidence for the relevance of informality in support of the 
‘localisation’ of anticorruption strategies. The rationale would be to conceive anti-corruption as a 
context-sensitive, inductive endeavour that is operationalised on the basis of observed practices and 
socially accepted behaviours. This would involve considering how key actors may be incentivised to 
adopt actions more conducive to better anti-corruption outcomes within the constraints (be them 
social, economic or political) that they are confronted with and taking into account their own interests 
and motivations. Innovative interventions would also aim to harness informality for better anti-
corruption, working with practices, norms and values that are entrenched and pervasive in the 
respective societies to improve government accountability and promote the welfare of communities.   
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1.2 Conceptual approach and methods 
The conceptual approach is grounded on the work of Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva (2017) and 
identifies three key patterns of informal governance – namely co-optation, control, and camouflage.  
• Co-optation is associated with recruitment into groups or networks. Co-optation is often associated 
to corruption because it represents a mechanism to regulate access to rent seeking opportunities 
and typically involves an informal redistribution of public resources. Among political elites, it is often 
expressed in the form of strategic appointments of allies and potential opponents, who are thereby 
granted impunity in exploiting the power and resources associated to public office in exchange of 
mobilizing support and maintaining loyalty to the regime. Co-optation can also be “horizontal” when 
political and business elites enter mutually beneficial relationships, where financial support for 
political goals is rewarded with privileged access to public contracts, undue tax exemptions and 
other illicit opportunities for extracting rents. 
• Control mechanisms are instrumental to manage clashes of competing interests and enforce 
discipline within networks. Examples of informal control mechanisms include the discretionary 
enforcement of anti-corruption legislation against dissidents and peer pressure through rules of 
loyalty and reciprocity that tie network members together by creating obligations and responsibilities 
vis-à-vis the group.  
• Camouflage refers to the manner in which informal transactions take place behind an institutional 
façade of democracy and commitment to the rule of law. This often means that, in contexts with 
high prevalence of informal practices, formal rules are often manipulated, undercut, diverted, or 
exploited for the sake of informal interests.  
 
The information upon which this report is based was collected through a review of the literature and 
media coverage of Rwandan governance and political development under the RPF, as well as focus 
group discussions with representatives of the Rwandan media and 28 in depth interviews with key 
national stakeholders. Interviewees included representatives from the three branches of government 
at the national level, officials from local government, officials from agencies and institutions dealing 
with the management and monitoring of public funds as well as those responsible for the 
implementation of socio-economic development programmes. Interviews were also undertaken with 
representatives of NGOs, local academic experts and scholars, and representatives of faith-based 
organisations. The interview data is quoted following a codification of the interviews ensuring 
anonymity of respondents.1  
1.3 Background to the Rwandan case 
There are not many success stories in the fight against corruption in Sub Saharan Africa, a region that 
generally fares badly in international corruption indices. However, Rwanda is an exceptional case, 
consistently showing low rates of corruption (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012a; Transparancy 
International 2015; Sebudubudu, Khatib, and Bozzini 2017b).2 This report aims to put Rwanda in a 
comparative perspective by delving into the role of informal practices in fuelling and containing 
corruption. Thus, the report seeks to address the question of whether and how informality and informal 
governance practices play a role in the macro-level processes that have underpinned the evolution of 
                                                   
1 The authors are grateful to Dr Lucy Koechlin and Dr Frederick Golooba-Mutebi for comments provided to an earlier version of this report and 
to Dr Saba Kassa and Mr Cosimo Stahl for formatting and copy editing assistance. 
2 See also: The latest East African Bribery Index https://tikenya.org/east-african-bribery-index/;  World Governance Index (interactive 
dataset, Country rating, Control of corruption under http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports; and TI CPI 2017 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 
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Rwanda from a country ravaged by war and Genocide to one of the star development performers in 
Africa.  
For Rwanda is indeed an exceptional performer in the region. During the 2005-11, annual economic 
growth was maintained at a robust 8% on average, the headcount poverty and extreme poverty ratios 
both fell by nearly 12%, taking a million people out of poverty, and income inequality declined 
significantly (UNDP 2014: 8). In fact, Rwanda was able to achieve even better results than proclaimed 
by its MDG target of 20% extreme poverty level by 2015 (UNDP 2014: 26). Undernutrition (of children 
under five) as well as mortality figures have consistently improved, even among the poorest 20%, and 
maternal mortality at child birth rates have dropped from 1,071 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 210 
in 2014/15 (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2015).3 More recently, Rwanda’s economy has 
ranked as the third best-performing among African nations, as measured by the World Economic 
Forum's annual Global Competitiveness Report.4  
Underpinning these results, Rwanda appears to be following a new development path sustained by a 
governance model that differs in many ways from surrounding countries. The governance 
arrangements that have been established under the leadership of Paul Kagame and the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) have been characterised by the ability to manage economic rents in a centralised 
way and subsequently deploying them with a long-term view, which is in line with the model of a 
patrimonial developmental state (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012b, Kelsall 2013). According to this 
perspective, the Rwandan example would represent nothing less than an alternative governance model 
that emphasises development and in so doing gives high priority to ensuring positive anti-corruption 
outcomes. This assertion requires further exploration, especially regarding the governing mechanisms 
required for effective rent management. 
The narrative on Rwanda is not without controversy especially when it comes to topics such as the 
nature of its political regime and accusations of human rights abuses. Another aspect often 
underscored by critics is that the influence of the ruling party is overwhelming both in politics and 
business, and that the regime operates under a curtain of secrecy whereby donor agencies express 
difficulty in understanding what is “happening behind the government’s doors” (Bozzini 2014, 24). 
Some international organisations also point to weak performance in areas such as “voice and 
accountability”, “participation of the population”, “transparency” and “independence of media” 
protection of political and human rights and civil liberties.5 Defenders of the regime, in turn, counter 
such criticism arguing that Rwandans have chosen a unique path to accountability. This local approach 
includes conventional anti-corruption prescriptions along with other innovative - “made in Rwanda” - 
governance tools, which escape adequate recognition and valoration because they are not aligned 
with internationally-recommended common practices.  
This report argues that the Rwandan case holds valuable lessons for development and anti-corruption 
practitioners that transcend a simple debate about the more or less authoritarian character of the 
regime. A key objective of this report is to shed light upon the underlying factors and drivers of the 
Rwandan success in fighting corruption and placing the analysis against the backdrop of broad, 
                                                   
3  For further socio-economic indicators highlighting these positive trends see the Human Development Report 2016. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report 
4 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/africa-most-prosperous-countries [accessed 01 May 2018] 
5  See https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/rwanda Rwanda also ranks comparatively low in Voice and 
Accountability in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports
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system-level processes that are plausibly associated with lower discretionary space and less 
opportunity for corrupt actions. 
The present report thus aims to distil both specific as well as general insights from the Rwandan 
experience in controlling corruption that serve as valuable lessons for anti-corruption practitioners. In 
pursuit of that goal, the report discusses 1) the nature of the post-Genocide political settlement tracing 
back key processes and events that led to current status quo, 2) distinct features of the Rwandan 
political regime, 3) the type of public sector and indeed societal reforms implemented that have 
supported the development of a strong and effective developmental state; as well as 4) the nature of 
Rwanda's economic growth based on a strongly state-led process of developing a competitive business 
sector.  
2 The Road Towards a Post-Genocide 
Political Settlement 
2.1 Setting the foundations of a new regime: the rise of Paul Kagame 
The military victory of the RPF that brought an end to the Genocide against the Tutsi (henceforth “the 
Genocide”) was followed by the convening of a national unity government that consisted of a mix of 
new and old faces. Many of the members of the new government had been high ranking civil servants 
under the previous regime, led by Juvénal Habyarimana, in which nepotism and corruption had been 
rampant. During the early years after the end of the violence, there were strong indications that 
practices involving abuse of public authority were being once again re-enacted; a number of high 
ranking members of the government coalition were accused of engaging in corruption and illegal 
accumulation of wealth, including extensive land grabs, at the disdain of the public. The extent to 
which illicit practices were prevalent and even condoned in the aftermath of the Genocide is reflected 
in the fact that looting was sarcastically called kubohoza, which translates as “liberating” in English 
(Kimonyo 2015). These trends fuelled a revolt among younger RPF ranks, who publicly denounced the 
situation as unethical and antithetical to the ideals of substantive change that they had fought for 
(Int.072017.h). The revolt triggered an internal reform of the RPF that changed the course of the 
reconstruction process significantly.  
In June 1996, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the RPF decided to engage in a process 
labelled critical self-examination, scrutinising the behaviour of its party members and the functioning 
of the party’s top governance structures. Discussions led to the convening of a special consultative 
assembly held in February, 1998, which came to be known as Kicukiro I. This assembly paved the way 
to a process of leadership renewal including the election of a new NEC and Political Bureau. Kicukiro-
I conveyed a strong message against abuse of authority within the RPF. Evidence for its credibility was 
provided by the fact that four out of seven commissioners of the NEC were not re-elected, although 
they were historical figures of the movement who had assumed ministerial positions. The process also 
led to the election of the Defence Minister, General Paul Kagame, as president of the party.  
Ten months later, a second party gathering, called Kicukiro II, continued to emphasise concerns over 
misconduct within the party, and further propelled the internal depuration process of the party. 
According to one interviewee, Kagame purged between 60 to 70 percent of RPF cadres within the 
scope of these party consultations, many of whom were war heroes who had amassed vast tracts of 
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land in the eastern part of the country. This process of extreme cadre renewal, which has been 
characterised by Booth and Goloba Mutebi (2012b) as arising out of the disagreements among RPF 
elites over competing governance models, ultimately led to the rejection of former neo-patrimonial 
practices of prebendal co-optation as instruments to reward supporters and loyalists. It also resulted 
in the centralisation of power and authority around the person and charismatic figure of Paul Kagame, 
who became president of Rwanda in 2000 (Kimonyo 2015).  
Ever since, the RPF-led government has consistently espoused a policy programme aimed at achieving 
“a veritable socioeconomic transformation of the country’ (Kimonyo 2015). Key elements of this policy 
programme originally arose out of the Urugwiro village discussions, which were consultations held 
among the RFP, other political parties that agreed to the terms of the political settlement, and 
representatives of different sectors of society. Ever since, central tenets adopted by President Kagame 
and the RPF for the future political and social development of Rwanda have been: a) an emphasis on 
promoting socio-economic development as the basis to cultivate reconciliation and consolidate 
political legitimacy, b) adherence to principles of power sharing and consensus decision-making 
among a plethora of other (non-RPF) actors but strictly excluding Hutu supremacists or any of those 
directly responsible for the Genocide (Golooba-Mutebi & Booth, 2013: 11) c) reference to traditional 
values for popular legitimation.  
Before exploring these three areas in-depth, we need to turn to the figure of President Kagame, who 
personifies political power in Rwanda. The centralisation of power in the figure of the president is also 
present in neighbouring countries and is a feature of informal governance regimes associated with 
high levels of corruption (see Sambaiga et.al 2018 and Ismailbekova 2018, for a discussion of 
centralised executive power and informal governance in Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania). Thus, a key 
question that this report seeks to address is: what features are distinct to the Rwandan political regime 
that account for its success in fighting corruption? 
2.2 The role of centralised, personalised power 
The previous section provides a narrative of the manner in which Paul Kagame carved an uncontested 
prominence within the RPF, which is inextricably linked to the mainstream narratives that praise the 
post-Genocide success in improving governance and development outcomes. Indicative of this, is the 
case of the zero tolerance to corruption stance, which has been lauded in the press for making 
“President Paul Kagame’s country a shining star.”6  
Paul Kagame grew up in exile with what Phillip Gourevich (2009) calls an experience of exclusion that 
led him to take up armed struggle and to viscerally reject ethnic considerations as having any role in 
public sphere.  Many of the leaders in the RPF government after the Genocide were for the most part 
outsiders who, like Kagame, grew up in exile and who engaged in armed struggle under extremely 
precarious conditions. According to interviews, this experience is linked to the great importance given 
to austerity and frugality as well as a high level of intolerance towards any behaviour driven by greed. 
Several interviewees, both in the public sector as well as civil society, confirmed the prevalence of an 
ingrained belief that President Kagame and his family consistently observe the strict standards 
required by the RPF code and have at no point lost the necessary moral authority (Int.022017.d; 
Int.032017.i; Ints.072017.d,e,i,g&h). Indeed, the ethos that characterises the Rwandan regime as 
imbued by high adherence to the law, the primacy of the duty to the nation, visceral rejection to 
sectarianism, frugality in public administration and intolerance to underperformance appears in the 
                                                   
6 Baffour Ankomah New African Magazine 19 March 2013. 
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public imagination as an almost exact mirror of the personal characteristics of the leader. This link is 
clearly manifest in the fact that one of the regime’s key performance monitoring schemes for top level 
public officials involves stating personal commitments which are incorporated into a contract and 
signed in the presence of the president (see section 4).  
Similarly, when it comes to the fight against corruption a consistent theme emanating from the 
interviews is that in Rwanda there is political will to fight corruption, which is invariably perceived to 
be personified by President Kagame. Most interviewees were of the opinion that the distinctiveness of 
the Rwandan authorities, compared to their counterparts in the region, resides in their capacity to be 
free of political interference in their decision-making. Similarly, interviewees with high level decision-
making authorities in key anti-corruption agencies pointed to the president’s direct instructions to 
enforce a zero tolerance to corruption approach and to the high degree of independence they enjoy in 
exercising their mandates (Ints.072017 a, b, c, e & f). One research participant characterised the effect 
of president Kagame’s leadership as “the opposite of the fish rotting from the head” (Int.072017.d). 
Such perceptions about leadership matter when it comes to attitudes towards corruption among the 
population. This is notable in countries such as neighbouring Uganda and Kenya, where average 
citizens frequently justify their own willingness to engage in practices of corruption by referring to the 
seemingly endless string of grand corruption scandals involving the political elites and the 
normalisation of corruption as a practice expected of and tolerated by the top political leadership (Baez 
Camargo, Bukuluki, et al. 2017)  
The importance of a strong and popular leader is also to be underscore because it matters for the 
purpose of enacting the radical transformation that was laid out for Rwanda following the Urugwiro 
village consultations. The ambitious reconstruction and national development goals agreed then 
demand a strong capability to enforce reforms and steer the coordinated actions of a complex 
constellation of actors. This provides a backdrop to the need of a leadership that enjoys autonomy 
from vested interests to be able to exercise authority forcefully, in a top-down manner towards 
achieving the proclaimed goals of the government (See Kupatadze 2018 for parallels with the Georgia 
reform experience). This degree of autonomy is linked to attributes of the post-Genocide political 
settlement, characterised by a rather small winning coalition in which the military play a crucial role ( 
Booth and Golooba Mutebi 2013). Elite cohesion is in this context, undoubtedly, facilitated by the high 
degree of personal legitimacy that the president enjoys. On the one hand, there is a widely-held belief 
among army officers, active and retired, that without Kagame at the helm of the RPA the war would 
probably have been lost. On the other hand, his authority also emanates from what some refer to as 
an almost puritanical approach to issues of personal conduct. These latter include his approach to the 
impartial integration of members of the Hutu community after the Genocide, who as a consequence 
view him as the sole guarantor of their security and wellbeing.7   
The strict enforcement of rules has led some to characterise the Rwandan development model as 
militaristic (Purdeková 2011a) and enforced in a similar manner as a guerrilla army is commanded 
(Campioni and Naack 2012).8 In fact, many high-level defections (even into the 2010s) been assumedly 
linked to an “underlying discontent with the rigours of leadership discipline under Kagame” (Booth and 
                                                   
7 We are thankful to Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi for pointing out these elements that contribute to the high levels of popularity enjoyed by 
President Kagame. 
8 One may question whether the effectiveness of this top-down may not be facilitated by broader socio-cultural tendencies. Indeed some authors 
have highlighted historical and cultural roots of strong top-down social control as a trait characteristic of Rwandans (Mulindahabi 2015) as 
reflected in popular sayings such as “intero iturutse ibukuru urikiriza” [when the tune comes from the top leadership you applaud]. Furthermore, 
Straus (2008) considers that such cultural traits are enabled by Rwanda’s human and physical geography which increase the capacity for 
surveillance and limits the opportunities for exit and escape. 
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Golooba-Mutebi 2012b, 9). The distinguishing features are, i) strong discipline enforced across the 
public sector, ii) re-education of the masses, and iii) an emphasis on sacrificing individual interests for 
the public good. These features enable the implementation of a development model that includes 
measures that work to fight corruption top-down through state-led institutional reforms, horizontally 
through close involvement with private sector actors and businesses, and from the bottom-up by 
means of redefining the national identity around a notion of integrity that supports anti-corruption at 
the grass roots. 
3 Characterising the Rwandan Political 
Regime 
Positive anti-corruption outcomes are often associated in the literature with democratic political 
regimes. Key arguments are that the processes and procedures associated with multi-party elections 
increase democratic accountability, including effective checks on state performance by non-state 
actors such as civil society organisations or the media (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017). However, 
this correlation is not entirely straightforward, as more recent contributions have shown. Evidence 
from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (See Musila et. al. 2018, Sambaiga et. al. 2018 and Golooba Mutebi 
2018) suggests that shifts from a one-party regime to multi party electoral competition actually 
exacerbate corruption risks. The fact that Rwanda, a success story in terms of its low levels of 
corruption, is more often than not characterised as an authoritarian regime points to the relevance of 
outlining the features of the Rwandan political regime for the purposes of this study.  
3.1 Power-sharing and consensus decision making as key principles of political engagement 
Whereas from its earliest days the RPF professed a determination to establish a “true democracy” 
defined as majority rule based on a genuine programme uniting all Rwandans (International Crisis 
Group 2001), the conceptualisation and operationalisation of democracy in Rwanda does not 
necessarily follow conventional expectations. At the core of the dynamics that characterise the 
Rwandan political regime are the principles of power-sharing and consensus building in decision-
making. 
At the core of the dynamics that characterise the Rwandan political regime are the principles of power 
sharing and consensus decision-making. These principles stem from the notion, enshrined in the 2003 
Constitution, that the regime is inclusive to all Rwandans who renounce ethnic divisionism and 
genocide ideologies. The constitution also stipulates power-sharing as a central guiding principle for 
major social and political arrangements. For instance, the President of the Republic cannot belong to 
the same party as the Speaker of the Parliament and no single party can accumulate more than 50% 
of the seats in the Cabinet. Power-sharing is also reinforced by the electoral system whereby elections 
to the lower house are based on proportional representation. All political parties, including those that 
are too small to gain parliamentary seats, receive state funding for capacity and programme 
development through the Forum of Political Parties.  
The power-sharing principle is further supported and reinforced by a commitment to decision-making 
by consensus as the best procedure for the adoption of national policies. Consensus decision-making 
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was explicitly intended to “recreate a sense of community and belonging among Rwandans proving 
that they can transcend their religious and ethnic divisions” (International Crisis Group 2001, 3). 
The degree to which the practices of power-sharing and consensus decision-making are genuinely 
observed is contested. On the one hand, in spite of the RPF’s prominence, there is evidence of power-
sharing with other political groups.  As of early 2013, there were ten registered political parties in 
Rwanda. Of these, eight had positions in government. The larger ones, whose representatives 
vigorously reject the suggestion that they are mere satellites of the RPF, hold important cabinet posts 
(Golooba-Mutebi & Booth, 2013: 9). Accusations that the regime is predominantly led by Tutsi elites 
also do not appear to be fully substantiated. There are many Hutus in the RPF and in the Government 
and Parliament representing other parties or as independents. In fact, the PSD, one of the RPF’s most 
important partners in the ruling coalition, used to be regarded as the party of the southern Hutus who 
were marginalised under the former Habyarimana regime. Moreover, some former members of the 
northern Hutu leadership, which was the core of the former regime, have joined the RPF and been 
brought into important positions in government, and in presidential elections, the Northwest brings in 
one of the largest votes for Kagame (Golooba-Mutebi & Booth, 2013: 15).9  
There is also evidence that differences of opinion about policy content generate heated debate among 
the parties before reaching a settlement, often based on compromise (Clark 2014), and that some 
policy decisions on which an agreement cannot be reached are postponed (Golooba-Mutebi & Booth, 
2013: 10).  
On the other hand, there are several voices that express the view that the formal power-sharing 
arrangements and consensus decision-making processes represent mere window dressing to the 
overwhelming power exercised by the RPF. Some interviewees observed that parties other than the 
RPF have no meaningful representation at the local level (Int.012017.b) and accusations have been 
made that top politicians who are not members of the RPF often have a RPF deputy assigned for 
informal monitoring (Purdeková 2011a). Other authors argue that because parties who fail to comply 
with the very strict rules set by the regime are denied registration, those who are granted a political 
voice are only those who acquiesce to the RPF rather than authentic opposition parties (Kelsall 2013, 
123). From such a perspective, the manner in which the political party system is organised in Rwanda 
together with the power-sharing principle could be seen as constituting a manner of co-optation of 
potential opponents into the fold of the RPF’s political programme of unity.  
Indeed, because the RPF regime prioritises unity above any other principle of political action, the 
practices it endorses seem to be often at odds with key principles of traditional liberal democratic 
thought such as that of pluralism (Dahl 2005). Limits to pluralism are especially evident in the manner 
in which political parties are regulated.  
Officially registered political parties belong to a Forum of Political Parties known as the National 
Consultative Forum of Political Organisations (NFPO). The forum receives annual financial support from 
the national budget which is accessed on the basis of need and for specific activities such as capacity 
building. This funding scheme is the only state funding for parties that is allowed (Golooba-Mutebi and 
Booth, 2013: 9) and is directly allocated by the government to support political activities of the parties. 
                                                   
9 Inclusiveness also extends to gender as Rwanda’s Chamber of Deputies is one of only two legislative bodies worldwide where women 
outnumber men (Cooper-Knock 2016).  
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The political parties, however, are not entirely in control of these resources because they do not 
receive the subsidy in cash, but rather get reimbursed for activities they organise (int.062017.a).  
Thus, the inclusion of other political parties in the government through the principle of power sharing 
is not with the view of enabling contestation but is rather part of the broader programme of 
consolidation of the RPF’s ideology. According to one interviewee close to the NFPO, the contribution 
given by the government is understood as promoting the capacity-building of the political parties 
through seminars and meetings to promote the formation of professional politicians who endorse and 
promote the official ideals of unity, patriotism and togetherness (Int.0620187.a). Yet another 
interviewee, a high-ranking government official, maintained that one cannot assess the Rwandan 
political regime utilising the categories and dimensions of the Western models of democratic practice 
that emphasise ideological contestation. Rather the analysis should “adopt the perspective of a divided 
society, where people were alienated from each other and where large inflows of repatriated Rwandans 
have been arriving, not only from neighbouring countries, but also from Europe and North America. In 
this context, the regime and all Rwandans needed to appropriate a project of society promoting 
patriotism and unity” (Int.072017.e).  
To the extent that, for the sake of preserving national unity, disagreements may be consistently 
expressed behind closed doors, it is probably impossible to ascertain whether power-sharing and 
consensus decision-making principles are actually genuinely observed, and therefore form part of a 
governance model radically different to that of public and adversarial policy-making, or whether they 
camouflage a reality of enforced consensus under RPF domination.  
However, a final point on this discussion to be noted is that the RPF and the Rwanda Patriotic Army 
(RPA) did have overwhelming military power at the end of the war in 1994. Thus, as Golooba-Mutebi & 
Booth (2013: 8) note, the RPF’s rejection of the principle of ‘winner takes all’ was a choice and not 
necessarily inevitable. It also constitutes a notable distinction to neighbouring regimes such as Kenya 
or Uganda. 
3.2 Limited electoral competition  
Consistent with the RPF ideology that gives pre-eminence to unity, elections are said to be embraced 
by the RPF government to the extent that they do not compromise national unity and reconciliation. 
In fact, some reports suggest that because President Kagame regards strong multi-party electoral 
contestation as conducive to the exacerbation of social divisions10 (International Crisis Group 2001, 
4), elections have been closely managed as in the case of the 2001 district elections, when it was 
ensured that only counsellors and district executives who endorsed the policy of national unity and 
reconciliation were elected. 
Paul Kagame has been the head of state since 2000 and has been re-elected three times with 
overwhelming majorities of 95% of votes in 2003, 93% in 2010 and 98.6% in 2017 which has raised 
criticism among external observers who interpret such landslide victories as not credible.11 The lack 
of an even playing field in the electoral arena is one of the often-cited shortcomings of the Rwandan 
democratic process. 
                                                   
10 A view, which is not necessarily exclusive to the President, but was widely shared during the consultations leading to the 2003 
Constitution. 
11  See, for instance: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/world/africa/rwanda-elections-paul-kagame.html, or 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/18/rwanda-politically-closed-elections 
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One interviewee, who belongs to an opposition party, pointed out that a serious challenge to opposition 
parties is the lack of structural and organisational capacities at the local level, which only the RPF 
possesses (Int.012017.b). Some authors go as far as to assert that the RPF has established influence 
at all levels through structures that “mimic those of the state […] with the result that the lines between 
ruling party and state are blurred” (Purdeková 2011a).  
Still, several observers insist that the overwhelming electoral victories of President Kagame cannot be 
explained away solely on the basis of an uneven playing field. High turnout levels (96% turnout was 
reported in the 2017 elections) suggest little voter apathy, even considering a 10-20% margin of error 
to account for inflated numbers. On the basis of those considerations, as well as the repeatedly 
occurring opinion among interviewees, it seems inescapable to acknowledge that President Kagame 
enjoys substantial support among Rwandans (Kiwuwa 2005: 459; The Economist Intelligence Unit 
2017). 
In neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda the research has shown that even 
limited contestation in multi-party elections is a significant driver of informal practices that exacerbate 
corruption risks (Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi 2018; Sambaiga, Koechlin, and Baez-Camargo 2018; Wrong 
2009). Those cases illustrate how by resorting to informal networks political elites mobilise significant 
amounts of resources in order to weaken the opposition and to secure the financial means to run 
costly electoral campaigns and to buy the support of key groups. The very restricted electoral 
contestation in Rwanda may well prevent such drivers of corruption from escalating. Furthermore, and 
as will be elaborated in detail later on, the ruling party is very well off. A steady stream of profits from 
RPF-owned business concerns have the side-effect of removing the pressure on the ruling party to 
raise political funds by corrupt methods (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012: 391).12  
3.3 Non-state watchdogs: the role of the media in Rwanda 
The Rwandan media are often characterised as enjoying relatively little press freedom and being 
predominantly state-controlled or supervised (Bozzini 2014). Focus Group Discussion participants and 
journalists indicated that there are significant limitations to their investigations about mismanagement 
in the public sector. In particular, intimidation was cited as frequently occurring among journalists who 
try to report corruption cases. Furthermore, journalists expressed that they fear to be sacked, which 
leads to self-imposed censorship while yet others said that public agencies involved in the fight against 
corruption think that to be more efficient, they need to avoid media interference and publicity and 
therefore are antagonistic to journalists (Int.032017.h).  
FGD participants also pointed to collusion between media managers or owners and big companies 
which prevents journalists from reporting anything that can tarnish the image of big businesses and 
companies (Int.032017.h). The research participants shared the example of a practice called “Giti” or 
asking for “imyanzuro y’inama” [literally being briefed on the conclusions of the meeting], whereby 
journalists approach the finance manager to be given an envelope (presumably with money) and be 
subsequently instructed on how to report the event in question. Equally, a CEO of a private media 
outlet said that “there is a big gap between what is said and what is really done.” For him, media 
cannot fulfil properly their role as informal watchdog by providing independent and free editorial line 
                                                   
12 Arguably, Rwanda's continued presence and involvement in illicit mineral extraction in neighbouring DRC also contributes to the 
remarkable financial independence of the party  (UN Security Council 2017). 
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on various issues. He said that media regarded as not friendly to the regime are shunned by some 
public institutions.  
Despite the fact that the laws regulating the media state that “a journalist shall have free access to all 
sources of information and the right to freely inquire on all events of public life, and to publish them in 
respect of the provisions of this Law and other Laws”, findings from the FGDs indicate that formal 
requests for accessing information can simply be ignored. The extent to which the informal constraints 
raised by the research participants hamper the ability of the Rwandan media to report on corruption 
is, however, an issue that goes beyond the scope of this report.  
4 State reform and top-down enforcement 
The identification of a strong link between reconciliation and development was clearly outlined early 
on in the Vision 2020 development plan that postulates the broad development goals of the Rwandan 
government. Vision 2020 states that it is by economic and social development that ethnic divisions 
and violent conflict will be avoided and a new Rwandan national identity will emerge that contributes 
to the efforts of boosting economic growth. 13  Vision 2020 has set ambitious goals, aiming at 
eradicating poverty and reaching middle class income levels by 2020. This is of particular relevance 
because, as Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Booth (2013) argue, the government has invested in 
cultivating support and legitimacy on the basis of economic development as opposed to patronage 
practices, which means that the stakes for delivering on performance are substantial. 
Achieving the development goals required a drastic reform of the public sector in order to strengthen 
state capabilities for improved service delivery. It also required, given the devastation left behind in 
the aftermath of the Genocide, a significant involvement of the state to fund and steer the basic 
activities needed to begin the process of reconstruction and to set the foundations for a propitious 
investment environment attractive to foreign capital, in which medium and small local business 
ventures could ultimately also thrive (see section 5).  
4.1 Public sector reforms 
The public sector reforms initiated in 1999 can be characterised as radical and far reaching. They 
comprised a continuous process of institutional engineering substantially increase public sector 
capacity and effectiveness, including the adoption of high-tech solutions to increase public sector 
transparency and reduce the discretionary space for corruption.  
Here we focus on those key areas where practices of co-optation, such as patronage and those 
involving clientelistic networks, tend to develop: namely decentralisation and human resource 
management practices of recruitment, performance monitoring and enforcement of sanctions.  
4.1.1 Decentralisation 
The RPF inherited the remnants of a highly centralised state administration. In 2000, the government 
passed a National Decentralisation Policy that had the stated goal to improve the delivery of essential 
                                                   
13 See http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/index.php?id=148 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 16 
public services and gave decision-making powers to mayors and the elected district councils for 
implementing national development programmes at the local/district level. Interestingly, one of the 
first reforms aimed at decentralising the public sector involved the reduction in the number of districts 
from 154 to 30. The rationale behind this reform was that fewer districts could be better staffed and 
resourced and thus more effectively administered than would be the case with a larger number of 
smaller districts (UNDP 2014, 21).14 This measure stands in contrast with the case of Uganda, where 
the commitment to decentralisation by the regime has resulted in a steady increase in the number of 
districts (from 39 in 1996 to 135 in 2016) which confront significant challenges associated to financial 
and human resources constraints (Baez-Camargo 2012). 
The importance of decentralisation is reflected in the fact that the government’s major social 
programmes are implemented by local-level authorities and the district-level budget is five times larger 
(10 billion RWF) than the budget at the ministry level (2 billion RWF). Thus, importance is also given to 
ensuring that adequate monitoring and accountability mechanisms are in place. Because of the 
decentralisation reform, the District Councils have the autonomy to recruit the staff and the process 
has been professionalised.15  
Questions about whether this step accounts for true decentralisation remain since the reform has 
placed a stronger accent on the delivery of national policies than on representation of local interests. 
Critical views on the manner decentralisation has taken place in Rwanda, such as those expressed by 
Scher (2014) are echoed by one high-level politician interviewee hold that although institutions might 
have been decentralised, decision-making and planning powers remain essentially a central 
government prerogative (Int.012017.b). On their part, supporters of the on-going decentralisation 
ascertain the autonomy of the districts in major issues such as development planning and 
implementation; staffing, and finance management, although this is nuanced by the fact that according 
to prescribed mechanisms national priorities are consolidated with local priorities during joint retreats 
of central government and local government experts and leaders.  
4.1.2 Human resource systems  
A key feature of the Rwandan public sector reform process has been a drastic reduction in public 
sector employment aimed at suppressing unnecessary posts and increasing its efficiency. These cuts 
were coupled with significant salary increases for the remaining positions. Two major waves of 
personnel cuts occurred, one in 1999 and another in 2006. According to (Hausman 2014), the number 
of staff in central ministries declined by up to 90% and salaries tripled for those who remained. 
Furthermore, relatively high salaries to public officials appear to be particularly relevant in the case of 
those institutions mandated with the oversight functions such as the Office of the Auditor General, 
whose staff are better paid than other civil servants (Int.072017.b). Former civil servants were rehired, 
but ministries received a good deal of fresh personnel, much of it comprised of returnees from the 
diaspora and, increasingly, recent graduates of the National University of Rwanda (now University of 
Rwanda) or universities in Uganda and other countries.  
This is one of the public sector reforms that led to significant structural change conducive to the 
control of corruption. In some of the neighbouring countries, a steady increase in the size of 
                                                   
14 According to the International Crisis Group (2001), decentralisation was also seen as a means to destroy the political machinery that facilitated 
the Genocide.  
15 The Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA), which is a non-profit joint venture of the Rwanda Governance Board 
and the Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Government which works with the 30 Districts and the city of Kigali providing them with services 
including staff recruitment. 
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government (at the national and local levels) as well as in other public entities has been associated 
with the extensive use of practices of co-optation i.e. unmerited appointment to jobs in the 
bureaucracy at all levels as a way to reward supporters and appease opponents. The corruption risks 
associated with bloated public sectors in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda emanate from such informal 
patterns of co-optation; but they have been compounded by notoriously low nominal wages, which in 
turn increase the incentives to supplement the income by means of informal means such as bribery 
and embezzlement  (Kane 2009).16   
Besides job cuts and wage increases the Rwandan regime has introduced changes to public sector 
recruitment regulations that limit the ability to use public sector employment as a co-opting currency. 
In that regard, the government set up a Public Service Commission in 2007 to standardise and oversee 
recruitment practices throughout the civil service. More recently, the recruitment process for the 
public sector has been digitalised and anonymised. An overall agreement persists that the Public 
Service Commission recruitment system is effectively based on merit (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2012a).  
One interviewee close to the recruiting authority outlined various efforts underway to curb corruption 
during employment and recruitment processes: first the digitalisation introduced in job application 
processes; second the codification of the applications and copies of exams; third the exclusion of 
telephone use by the officials involved in supervising or correcting exams (Int.042017.a).  
It should be noted that the Rwandan government has pursued a similar approach in the recruitment 
practices of powerful RPF-owned enterprises, which are known for having extremely open and 
competitive policies for the recruitment of managers, engineers and other technical specialists, some 
of whom are recruited from outside the country. As Kelsall (2013, 130) notes, these practices stand 
in contrast to one of the distinguishing features of the African informal pattern in which “’jobs for the 
boys’  and jobs for locals take precedence over firm efficiency and competitiveness.” 
4.2 Accountability, monitoring, good governance and zero tolerance 
The Rwandan anti-corruption legal framework in Rwanda quite comprehensive. 17 In addition, the 
Government of Rwanda has ratified international treaties and conventions related to anti-corruption 
activities. These include the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2014; the 
African Union Convention against Corruption (AUCAC) and the East African Community Treaty against 
Corruption. 
The implementation of laws and official policies is stringent in Rwanda. Punishment of corruption and 
related offences entail extremely harsh sanctions (Baez Camargo, Gatwa, et al. 2017). Even minor 
                                                   
16 Related to those considerations, the World Bank (2014) identified substantial salary increases as a means of addressing petty corruption 
among bureaucrats and providers of public services, although there is conflicting evidence on its effectiveness (for a succinct discussion see 
U4 2013) https://www.u4.no/publications/salary-top-ups-and-their-impact-on-corruption/pd 
17 It comprises laws defining, punishing and preventing corruption including the organic law no 01/2012/OL of 02/05/2012 establishing 
the Penal Code, particularly articles 633 to 651 repressing corruption; organic Law no 61/2008 of 10/09/2008 on the leadership Code of 
Conduct as modified and complemented by Organic Law no 11/2013/OL of 11/09/2013 [OG of 28/10/2013]; Organic Law no 
12/2013/OL of 12/09/2013 on the State’s finances and property; Organic Law No 10/2013/OL of 11/07/2013 governing Political 
Organisations and politicians. According to this law, article 40,  politicians and political organisations shall be prohibited to commit acts of 
corruption and other related offences; Law no 12/2007 of 27/03/2007 on public procurement as modified and complemented by law no 
05/2003 of 13/02/2013, particularly its article 10 on the anti-corruption measures: prohibition to accept or solicit directly or indirectly, 
offer to an employee or a former employee of the procuring entity or other public institution, a bribe in any form, to compromise someone 
with respect to any act or decision connection with the procurement proceedings. And the tender committee is instructed to reject any 
bidder’s that is suspected to be engaged in acts of corruption or fraud; Law no 35/2012 of 19/09/2012 protecting the whistle-blowers; 
Law no 76/2013 of 11/09/2013 determining the mission, powers, organisation and functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman; 
Presidential Order no 27/01 of 30/05/2011 determining the organisation, functioning and mission of the Financial investigation Unit; 
Presidential Order no 64/01 of 12/02/2014 determining the responsibilities, organisation and functioning of the Advisory Council to fight 
against corruption and injustices. 
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(petty) offences are strongly condemned and punished. Mbaraga (2017) reported that a list of persons 
convicted of corruption that was published by the Office of the Ombudsman included people who gave 
a bribe as small as RWT 1,000 or 2,000 and were subsequently imprisoned for 1-2 years.  
Beyond the legal framework, the Rwandan regime emphasises a culture of integrity, beginning with its 
own ruling party. The RPF has a long-standing code of conduct. There is a component of changing the 
culture at the workplace, notably, what it means to be an honest and responsible public servant. 
Austerity has been instituted as the style of the government. Under the “Zero Fleet Policy” adopted in 
February and March 2005, only the five top leaders of the Government of Rwanda are entitled to an 
official car or residence (Government of Rwanda, 2014). 18  Shaming and respect are linked to 
performance at the workplace. There are both positive incentives but also significant costs for 
underperformance. In contrast with public servants in neighbouring countries, “if one gets appointed 
in countries like Uganda, Kenya one makes a party; in Rwanda the person can begin to shake with 
fear” (Int.072017.g). 
Monitoring and accountability mechanisms in the Rwandan public sector are varied. Some follow 
conventional approaches to performance management, others perform similar functions while 
appealing to traditional Rwandan values and yet others make use of sophisticated information and 
communication technologies (ICTs).  Overall, a notable feature of the monitoring activities and 
performance evaluation mechanism across the Rwandan public sector is that they tend to be given a 
high degree of visibility. Other mechanisms of public accountability are the National Leadership 
Retreat, the National Dialogue, all of which bring together representatives of citizens, experts, media 
and different strata of society (Int.072017.d.,e&f). 
For instance, 84% of government expenditures are audited out of a 295 billion budget and the 
expectation prevails that the Auditor General’s report may not be delayed even by a single day 
(Int.072017.b). The follow-up of the Office of the Auditor General’s (OAG) reports is undertaken by the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament and the National Public Prosecution Authority [NPPA], 
which are given six months to analyse the reports and thereafter presents its recommendations during 
a plenary session that is televised. Statistics on crimes including the names of the offenders are 
regularly published. The police have also implemented many internal control regulations to ensure that 
corruption within the agency is properly investigated and sanctioned. Statistics on internal offences 
are published on a monthly basis (Int.092016.a).  
Part of the public service delivery reform has involved reducing the opportunities for corruption 
through the digitalisation of the vast majority of public services, including tax collection processes. 
Access to government services is done via the website Irembo which connects directly to the Office of 
the Rwanda Revenue Authority [RRA]. This digital platform has been an important part of the 
government’s strategy to combatting corruption by reducing discretionary use of providers’ authority 
by providing users with information about processing times and fees. Furthermore, Irembo eliminates 
the exchange of money between public officials and citizens since all payments for services are made 
directly to the bank account through auto generated information from the central office of the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority. The police have digitalised many of its services, including driving license 
applications, renewals, motor technical control and payment of traffic fines via the Irembo website. 
                                                   
18 The five public functionaries who have a right to an official car and an official residence are the president of the Republic, the President of the 
Senate, the Speaker of the Parliament; the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Court. All other ministers and senior authorities 
receive a tax exemption for the purchase of a car and favourable bank loans for acquiring a residence. 
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Similarly, the Rwanda Procurement Authority, which oversees all public procurement processes, has 
introduced a digitalisation system, through a new website called Umucyo.  
4.3 Imihigo performance contracts 
Worthy of particular attention, the Imihigo contracts are a performance evaluation mechanism widely 
used across the Rwandan public sector. In the ancient Rwandan kingdom, Imihigo involved a process 
whereby individuals would set personal goals and commit to their achievement publicly, usually before 
the king, village chief or the head of a clan or family. Subsequently, there would be an evaluation 
ceremony - called “Guhigura Imihigo” or ‘Kwivuga ibigwi’ - where an individual’s success in achieving 
the stipulated goals would be praised and rewarded. Rwandans resorted to this cultural practice when 
they sought to overcome a particular problem requiring voluntarism and commitment from an 
individual, an organised group or from all citizens. The community regarded such commitments as acts 
of bravery and held high expectations for their achievement (Rwanda Governance Board 2014, 85).  
Today, the practice of Imihigo has been re-invented and forms the backbone of a central performance 
monitoring scheme that covers all public institutions and officials in Rwanda. District mayors, 
governors, cabinet ministers and ambassadors sign Imihigo contracts directly with President Kagame 
before the two chambers of the Rwandan Parliament on an annual basis. Some of these ceremonies 
are widely publicised on Rwandan television and Radio, and the documents are made public on district 
websites and the local press so that citizens in the districts know exactly what their leaders have 
committed to.  
Achievement of Imihigo commitments is scrutinised at cabinet meetings and during leadership 
retreats, in the presence of the President. Districts are ranked according to performance and top 
achievers receive awards which are considered to bring status and prestige to the recipients (Scher 
2014; Hasselskog 2016). Conversely, there is consensus that consequences are serious for those who 
fail to fulfil their duties and Imihigo commitments. One high-ranking government interviewee stated 
that failing to fulfil an Imihigo contract would make a person appear as “incapable”, which is locally 
understood to be a public humiliatiion (Int.072017.e). Furthermore, underperformance may lead to 
public questioning and even to dismissal (Versailles 2012; Scher 2010: 8).  
The strict enforcement of the Imihigo process, provides ministers, permanent secretaries and other 
officials with an unusual level of motivation and incentive to perform (Booth, Calabrese, and Golooba-
Mutebi 2017).  The visibility of the Imihigo process is further said to enhance accountability; together 
with the reformed recruitment processes detailed above, these procedures make top down co-optation 
exceedingly difficult, as the performance of individual officials is monitored closely and made public 
on a regular basis. A high level official working on governance matters indicated that the fact that from 
the first class of elected mayors only two were re-elected was a clear indication that top down co-
optation is not a widespread practice (Int.072017.e). 
5 Relations with the business sector 
The Rwandan government has expressed a strong commitment to the private sector as an engine f 
growth and development. However, the economic model that the government has pursued departs 
from conventional market-led development prescriptions, in that it gives the state a central role to 
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intervene in and manage the development of a national private sector.19 In fact, a crucial characteristic 
of the reconstruction of the Rwandan economy post-Genocide has been the direct involvement of the 
RPF in the private sector of the economy. Party-owned enterprises have played – and continue to play 
- a central role in the Rwandan economy, which has given reason for critics to suggest that businesses 
close to the regime receive preferential treatment such as unduly obtaining profitable government 
contracts.  
Patterns of horizontal co-optation, whereby political and business elites engage in mutually beneficial 
exchange at the expense of public resources are a recurring feature in regimes affected by high levels 
of corruption in East Africa and beyond (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017; Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi 
2018; Sambaiga and Baez-Camargo 2018; Kelsall 2013). This section explores the main features of 
the Rwandan economic model with particular focus on the relationship between the state and the 
private sector, with a particular focus on factors that are conducive to (limiting) corruption.  
5.1 Genesis of a state-led approach to economic reconstruction 
In the aftermath of the Genocide, the business sector was devastated, which meant that in order to 
jump-start the economy it had to be built up from scratch. In this process, the Rwandan political 
leadership deemed that a strong but strategic state involvement was necessary to enable the 
economic reconstruction of the country. The RPF-led government stepped in to mobilise domestic 
resources as well as from the diaspora, creating state-owned entities that would perform key market 
functions which the private sector was not in a position to undertake. This was the logic behind the 
creation of several prominent business endeavours that to date continue to play an important role in 
the Rwandan economy: Crystal Ventures Limited, a holding company mobilising investment in key 
areas; the Rwanda Investment Group (RIG), a consortium for funding major infrastructure and 
development projects; and Horizon Group, an investment company linked to the military with interests 
in construction and logistics.  
Tri Star Investments was created in 1995 out of financial contributions to the war, It is owned by the 
RPF and changed its name to Crystal Ventures Limited in 2009. At the outset, the primary purpose of 
TriStar was to respond to the extreme shortages that affected the Rwandan economy in the aftermath 
of the Genocide. Profits were used among other things to address acute material shortages, pay for 
government salaries and to import consumables.  
As TriStar became more profitable with the recovery of the Rwandan economy, the dividends began 
to flow back to the RPF becoming subject to decisions of the RPF executive committee (Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2012b, 12). Nowadays Crystal Ventures Limited is the largest investment company in 
the country, it owns companies across multiple sectors and is the country’s top private employer. 
The RPF government also brokered the creation of a private investment consortium that brought 
together a group of influential entrepreneurs. This consortium, the Rwanda Investment Group (RIG) 
was created in May 2006, at the instigation of President Kagame “in response to the difficulty of raising 
funds for large projects in the absence of a local capital market” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012b, 
23). According to Kelsall (2013, 132) it “brings together ‘nearly all’ of the richest and best known 
individual business people of Rwanda and the diaspora along with the major public financial 
                                                   
19 A high-ranking parliamentarian commented that what is crucial for promoting growth in developing countries like Rwanda is the government’s 
mindful intervention and to not be ideological in opting for a unique way of organising the economy JBN & AD, Interview with PAC leadership 9 
February 2017. 
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institutions.” Its mandate is to raise capital for investments of particular national interest and to foster 
“economic patriotism.” 
In addition, the government also encouraged the army (including those demobilised, retired service 
men and the disabled by war) to create a business conglomerate called Horizon Group to undertake 
socio-economic projects. Horizon Group has engaged in construction, housing projects, and logistics 
among others. It has clear political and social goals.  
This proactive approach to growing the internal market included harnessing unexploited economic 
opportunities in the absence of local and international investors. This was achieved by means of 
support to business interests that have close links to the RPF, a strategy that has been justified by 
President Kagame who has said that “we wanted to see a difference in our country where nobody was 
coming to invest” (KT Press 2017). However, the direct relation between the hegemonic political party 
and business players also contradicts the conventional agreement that all businesses should compete 
on a level playing field and has therefore generated substantial questions about the anti-corruption 
credentials of the regime.  Aside from the question about the potential negative economic 
consequences of a strong nexus between public authorities and business interests, a key concern for 
the purposes of this study is whether the links between the ruling party and prominent business 
interests lead to the undue enrichment of political elites and their allies or the abuse of public authority 
to benefit particularistic interests. 
5.2 Developmental patrimonialism 
Close links between business and politics almost always are associated with neo-patrimonialism. But 
as Kelsall suggests there are more or less developmental forms of neo patrimonialism. According to 
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012b: 3) “a country is said to display developmental patrimonialism when 
the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralised 
way with a view to enhancing their own and others’ incomes in the long run rather than maximising 
them in the short run.” 
Arguments supporting the notion that Rwanda approximates the description of a developmental 
patrimonial regime point out that a continuous feature of Tri-Star/CVL operations lies in the fact that 
they have been willing to undertake substantive risks in order to fund investments with high expected 
social benefits and/or positive economic externalities, including those associated with venture 
capitalism (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012a). The company made investments that were more clearly 
informed by a long-term vision for the development of economy, for example by triggering 
demonstration effects aimed at stimulating investment by private firms in new or stagnant sectors of 
the economy (Kelsall 2013, 128).  
Research into the trajectory of the RPF’s involvement with business concerns suggests that state 
intervention is conceived strategically to jump start economic growth and build up investors’ 
confidence with the aim of consolidating a wider economic environment where the private sector can 
take a leading role in fostering economic growth (David Booth, Calabrese, and Golooba-Mutebi 2017; 
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011). As part of its proactive stance to attract foreign investment the 
Rwandan government signed memoranda of understanding with several firms from the export sectors, 
in which the firms set export targets and the government commits to resolving policy-related problems 
that the firms see as constraints to their performance. In addition, Rwanda has adopted most policies 
and institutional arrangements promoted as best practice by the World Bank, significantly simplifying 
and modernising the regulatory regime for private enterprise, which is reflected in Rwanda’s ranking 
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as second best performer in Sub Saharan Africa in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings.20 
In addition, the government has also aimed to address the significant weakness of the local business 
sector through the creation of an initiative – the Private Sector Federation -  that focuses on stimulating 
interest representation and capacity building among small and medium sized firms. 
Thus, the strategy of the government is clearly not centred on consolidating a dominant role of the 
state over the economy. In fact, nearly all the parastatals inherited from the Habyarimana years have 
been privatised. In the coffee sector, for instance, the government dismantled the state monopsony 
export agency (Rwandex) which exported up to 80% of coffee out of the country and was used as a 
vehicle for rent extraction by the ruling elites during the Habyarimana years (Behuria 2014). 
Privatisation has been undertaken through a highly monitored process that follows the trajectory of 
the privatised firms in order to prevent mismanagement and economic underperformance, with the 
result that several companies were subsequently re-privatised when they did not meet the 
expectations in providing required injections of capital and know-how (Kelsall 2013, 131).  
5.3 Political links 
Scholars who have conducted in-depth research into Rwanda’s political economy have found no 
evidence of direct profit by individual members of the RPF elites (Booth, Golooba-Mutebi and Kelsall 
2013). Kelsall (2013) also noted that while state-owned firms in Rwanda have taken risks and 
assuming learning costs that other private sector actors were unwilling to assume, they also profited 
from direct and unhindered access to government and large public contracts. However, this author 
also finds that the instances where economic rents were realised, profits have been reinvested 
strategically in areas with expected social benefits or where economic externalities and initial learning 
costs keep private investment away. 
In many developing countries, the funding of politics is reliant on collusive relations in which 
opportunities for rent seeking are handed out to individuals and businesses in exchange for votes and 
political support during critical elections.  
In Rwanda, the source of funding stems partly from member contributions but also from the party-
owned businesses. In distinction to its neighbouring countries, the profits of these companies go 
directly to the ruling party’s coffers, and do not line the pockets of powerful individuals. Crystal 
Ventures has been led by a board of directors that is nominated by the RPF leadership and without a 
doubt the company represents a steady source of income for the party. According to Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi, this income is precisely one of the reasons why the government does not need to 
engage in corruption in order to raise funds for its political activities. (2012b, 13). Indeed, according 
to news reports, Crystal Ventures funded half of the RPF’s electoral campaign in 2010 (The Economist 
2017). This direct link also means that industrial policy is unlikely to be hindered by rent seeking 
considerations (David Booth, Calabrese, and Golooba-Mutebi 2017) allowing for the precedence of 
policy over particularistic interests.  
 
                                                   
20 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings?region=sub-saharan-africa [accessed 1 May 2018] 
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6 Traditions and salience of cultural values 
as form of popular legitimation  
6.1 Home grown solutions 
One of the central features of the development model arising from the consultations at Urugwiro was 
the salient role given to Rwandan traditions and social values in the reconstruction process. While the 
idea of rehabilitating traditional African values to foster progress and development is certainly not new 
Zadi Kessy 1998: 219; Ki-Zerbo 1992), the extent to which the Rwandan government has embraced 
pre-colonial traditions in operationalising some of its key social policies and public sector management 
approaches, the so-called Home Grown Solutions (HGS), is notable.  
The links of the Imihigo performance monitoring mechanism to practices of pre-colonial Rwanda has 
already been noted. In addition, most of the RPF government’s signature social policies are inspired 
by and appeal to traditional practices and values. The HGS are meant to play a pivotal role in promoting 
social welfare and restoring social cohesion. For instance, the Ubudehe programme, which is one of 
the government’s main anti-poverty initiatives, is based on traditional notions of solidarity assistance.21 
Under this scheme, the population is classified into four categories according to their economic 
situation in order to target a series of benefits to the poorest. Such benefits include access to free 
health services, direct monetary transfers, job opportunities and assistance in forming cooperatives 
with eased access to bank loans.  
Furthermore, each particular programme is imbued with significance. For instance, the Girinka 
Munyarwada programme aims to give a cow to every low-income family. In the traditional Rwandan 
pastoralist society, the cow was a highly valued symbol of status and wealth, played a prominent role 
in family heritage, was highly valued as source of fertilizers, and constituted a symbol of friendship. 
Drawing from this symbolic meaning, Girinka is intended to work both as a programme for poverty 
alleviation but also as a mechanism for reconciliation because giving a cow is understood to create a 
social pact and instil a sense of belonging; and in this regard, a cow would be given by the State as 
joint ownership to families who were alienated by the genocide.22  
The HGS are meaningful because the traditional values they emulate play a much deeper role in 
contemporary Rwanda than simply providing a substantiating element to government social policies. 
The traditional values and practices of pre-colonial Rwanda have been articulated as the foundations 
of a moral order under the RPF-led government where interdependence, solidarity, and integrity 
become key drivers of social cohesion. The term for integrity, Ubunyangamugayo, which is repeatedly 
alluded to in public discourse, has in Kinyarwanda a much more complex meaning than the English 
translation suggests. It involves refusing to be ashamed and to take actions that contribute to a sense 
of pride; a wider meaning that provides a backdrop against which different behaviours are understood 
and judged. Thus, the term acquires relevance when applied to corruption as it emulates a sense of a 
moral transgression that goes beyond simply breaking a rule (int.072017.e).  
                                                   
21 Traditionally Ubudehe involved community work associated with the farming activity whereby neighbours would help each other to cultivate 
the land during farming season or to build houses. In a context where farming technologies were inexistent and peasants relied on individual 
family manual work, the Ubudehe activity was particularly instrumental in assisting the most vulnerable (widows; elderly) who lacked institutional 
assistance. 
22 The program was conceived under Vision 2020 aiming at giving cows to 350,000 families at its completion in 2018. 
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One interviewee, considered that “the government is convinced that it cannot achieve good 
governance without focusing on people, systems and organisations; it is determined to build a culture 
where integrity is valued and corruption rejected” (Int.032017.k). Bottom-up integrity, discipline, 
participation and a sense of obligation are attributes associated with the notion of a new Rwandan 
citizen (umunyarwanda). Civic education is a key component for this endeavour. 
Two key programmes are aimed precisely at fostering a cultural shift that promotes reconciliation and 
national reconstruction on the basis of values of integrity, solidarity and patriotism, promoted by the 
RPF regime. The itorero and ingando programmes are conceived as schools of excellence, to which 
attendance is mandatory and which may last weeks or even months. Ingando are camps where 
individuals go to learn about the history of Rwanda and the work of the government (Purdeková 2011b, 
7). They have been used to reintegrate former combatants and other returnees from the diaspora, but 
are also attended by the youth, including college students, head teachers, district education officers, 
civil servants and members of professional associations. While some camps have a military component 
with accent on discipline, physical exercises and military training, politicisation remains central in the 
discussions on government policy and history that characterise all Ingando training. The emphasis is 
strongly on RPF political ideology underscoring the principle that “being Rwandan matters above all 
else” (Purdeková 2011b, 14). According to (Gatwa Forthcoming) these programmes are 
conceptualised as "a journey of re-education” in the Marxist sense of Amilcal Cabral which brings 
together bases and elites around the acceptance to be re-Africanized". 
Itorero can be understood as an advanced version of the Ingando and is a programme aimed at 
selected individuals from the elites whose main aim is the defence of state politics. In a manner akin 
to the logic of the Imihigo mechanism, Itorero graduates [intore] must pledge to specific goals, which 
they are expected to pursue once they return to their communities. More generally, intore are expected 
to become “opinion leaders” and “fighters for change” facilitating “change away from bad 
[mentalities]” (Campioni and Naack 2012). These values are highly conspicuous throughout the 
country, visibly displayed on large stones and billboards in public spaces, roads, buildings, and offices 
of different administrations.   
6.2 Bottom-up component 
This aspect of the Rwandan development model acquires particular relevance in the comparative 
analysis with other countries in the region. From a bottom-up perspective, the Rwandan government’s 
relationship with citizens also deviates from the pattern observed in neighbouring countries. In Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda the research has shed light onto the manner in which citizen expectations vis-à-
vis their leaders are permeated by decades of clientelist practices. For one thing, in those three 
countries citizens regularly expect to receive some material incentive in exchange for their votes. Also, 
social groups expect their leaders to “eat” on their behalf. Support for political leaders is thus a 
function of their ability to deliver benefits in a particularistic manner to their networks of supporters. 
Social status and respectability are tied to the ability to deliver irrespective of where the funds come 
from and how they have been acquired, and this is linked to inherent social acceptability, or at the 
minimum tolerance, of corrupt behaviours. 
Research into the relevance of social norms and practices in shaping attitudes towards petty 
corruption in Tanzania (Baez Camargo, Sambaiga, et al. 2017) and Uganda (Baez Camargo, Bukuluki, 
et al. 2017) shows that conflicts between the formal legal framework and informal social normative 
prescriptions are important factors fuelling practices of bribery and favouritism. In this respect, the 
strategy of the RPF to redefine Rwandan national identity ultimately strives to reshape the normative 
criteria by which behaviours are categorised as acceptable and granting respect and status or 
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conversely condemned and therefore associated to shame and social isolation. Rwanda is a clear 
outsider in a region where shame is often not attached to notions of corruption, or where in some 
cases corruption is even expected and socially accepted. 
Pre-empting corruption at the grass-root level is linked to the acceptance and even enforcement of 
these values with the result that, in the words of one interviewee, “In Rwanda corruption has become 
a taboo” (interview RALC). Several interviewees further coincided in the view that corruption has 
become a source of social shame at the community level. Part of the reason are the huge social costs. 
“If you are caught you are socially ostracised, there is no possibility of being pardoned. Indeed, 
because the costs [of engaging in corruption] are exceedingly high, corrupt networks can be 
destroyed” (interview TI). 
In Rwanda, multiple official programmes and activities operate at the grassroots level that are aimed 
at disseminating and promoting a model of communitarianism, power-sharing, consultative based and 
consensual decision-making. A change in mindset by mainstreaming the good practices and 
behaviours that characterise Rwandan citizens is a recurring theme in the official discourse. Such 
grassroots activities diverge from the conventional view of citizenship articulation in democratic 
polities, which relies on interest representation and contestation, individualism and dissent.  
Popular participation in the public sphere is encouraged in various ways but in a highly structured 
manner and within strict boundaries. For instance, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Government 
has instituted Wednesday as a week day for public hearings. One of the authors has attended hearings 
at the local administration [Umurenge] where it is evident that local authorities are mindful of the 
serious consequences they would face if identified as providing poor services to the populations. 
Furthermore, there are claims that these public hearings are carefully monitored – both formally and 
informally and that in fact the levels of participation are quite low (Hasselskog 2018).  
Imihigo extends to the household level which is a clear expression of the supremacy given to the 
collective over the individual. Citizens are expected to participate in community and national 
development goals. Each head of household signs a contract committing to reach certain proposed 
targets within a pre-specified period of time, habitually one year, to which they are held accountable. 
This is the extension to the household realm of the imihigo performance monitoring mechanism that 
applies across the public sector. While Imihigo as a national programme for public institutions was 
introduced in 2006, it was only in 2012 that it was extended to households.  Household contracts are 
meant to encourage people to be involved in their own development through discipline and hard work. 
Local leaders and visiting officials are supposed to monitor progress and assist residents to realise 
their contract commitments (Hasselskog 2016). Individual households can be held accountable for 
not fulfilling their obligations vis-à-vis the community. Individuals who have received trainings in the 
vision of Rwandaness, especially those cohorts graduating from ingando and itorero, are expected to 
be vigilant of the safeguarding of the values of integrity and patriotic duty, mimicking to some extent 
the historical social armies of pre-colonial times, whose main reason for existence was the physical 
defence of the country (Kagame 1952).  
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7 Conclusions: Informal governance 
practices and control of corruption 
outcomes in Rwanda  
7.1 Is Rwanda a good governance success story?  
In spite of positive international rankings and the clear strides taken by the RPF regime to combat 
abuse of public authority, it would obviously be mistaken to conclude that corruption has been 
eradicated in Rwanda. During the course of the research, several interviewees working in the 
accountability sector across several state institutions highlighted gaps in the legal framework that 
remain to be addressed and which could further improve anti-corruption outcomes in Rwanda. These 
include, for instance, the fact that Rwandan law at the time of the research did not consider 
embezzlement as a crime of corruption (Int.072017.c, Int.092016.a; Int.072017.f). 23  Another 
interviewee pointed out that the weaknesses in the law are reinforced by the absence of adequate co-
ordination among the agencies involved in the fight against corruption (Int.032017.k). Other 
interviewees recounted multiple instances of fraud and corruption in the delivery of the social 
programmes that are meant to combat poverty (Int.032017.b; Int.032017.c; Int.052016). Also, 
interviews with officials in several of the anti-corruption agencies suggested that one of the serious 
challenges they face is the scarcity of well trained staff, particularly in legal matters and corruption 
investigations, which delays the analysis and follow-up of audits (Int.072017.b.,d and f). 
Instances of suspected corruption in the Rwandan procurement sector can also be recounted. News 
reports have pointed to dozens of national development projects that have stalled due to corruption 
and gross mismanagement (Mugisha 2016) and the Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee has 
uncovered many instances of “rwiyemezamirimo” [entrepreneurs] whose contracts never meet the 
standards for which they are paid, thus arising suspicion of corruption and procurement fraud” 
(Int.022017.a). 
In view that corrupt practices are never realistically completely eradicated the question that arises is 
whether instances of corruption in Rwanda should be regarded as the manifestation of a governance 
regime based on particularistic considerations, where corruption represents the normal state of affairs, 
or rather that instances of corruption are better seen as exceptions formed in the context of an 
otherwise universalistic governance regime. In other words, in light of the evidence collected in this 
study, where is it reasonable to locate the Rwandan case in the spectrum of public resource allocations 
with full particularism at one end and full ethical universalism at the other (cf. Mungiu-Pippidi and 
Johnston 2017)?  
The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that petty corruption as a normalised practice has been 
eliminated in Rwanda. This is down to the promotion of behaviours associated to “Rwandaness” that 
are aligned with respect for the rule of law, which is reinforced by harsh punishments for those found 
guilty of crimes of corruption. However, control of corruption from the bottom-up, is not only prevalent 
due to fear of repercussions but also because it addresses one of the most important drivers of petty 
corruption through the notable improvements in the quality and accessibility of essential public 
                                                   
23 Since then the Law Reform Commission has agreed to change the law. 
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services. Findings from another research project indicate that, in contrast to their counterparts in 
Tanzania and Uganda, Rwandan users of public services can, as a general rule, obtain the services they 
seek in a manner consistent with their legal rights and entitlements and without the need to resort to 
practices of bribery, gift-giving or favouritism. That same research also shows how there is a common 
perception among citizens and service providers alike that bad performance is routinely detected and, 
as a result of strict law enforcement, petty corrupt transactions, while not completely eradicated, have 
become much more secretive and hard to plan (Baez Camargo, Gatwa, et al. 2017).  
Some voices suggest that strict law enforcement is aimed only at minor offenses and low-level public 
officials. For example, Bozzini has criticised the RPF regime’s anti-corruption credentials arguing that 
“whistle-blowers are tolerated only if they denounce petty corruption, not affecting the ruling party or 
the military” (2014: 26).  The significant influence of RPF-owned business concerns in the Rwandan 
economy is another factor that often exacerbates suspicions about grand corruption. Among our 
interviewees, the topic proved divisive with the majority of voices denying that such high-level 
corruption plots could survive the scrutiny enforced by the regime, although a couple of interviewees 
in the law enforcement and judiciary agreed on the likely existence of protected high-level actors who 
operate with impunity (Int.092016.a; Int.032017.k). Yet some other voices argue that "big fish" are 
indeed prosecuted, particularly for gross mismanagement and embezzlement, but their cases may not 
be mediatised enough because the Rwandan law does not consider embezzlement as corruption 
offence (Ombudsman New Times: 02-08-2017). 
A significant challenge in unravelling whether such rumours and accusations about grand corruption 
are validated lies in the nature of top-level decision-making, which is claimed to follow the principle of 
consensus among the different political groups that partake in the power-sharing government 
arrangements, but nonetheless happen for the most part behind closed doors. The problem of making 
a fair assessment is compounded by the lack of pluralism and tight controls prevailing in those 
institutions and sectors that typically are relied upon to exercise a watchdog function vis-a-vis public 
authority such as the Parliament, the media and civil society (Sebudubudu, Khatib, and Bozzini 2017a). 
However, other empirical accounts that coexist with those critical voices assert that evidence for such 
grand corruption allegations is lacking. For instance, according to David Booth, Calabrese, and 
Golooba-Mutebi (2017) the military is well provided for but, according to their interview data, individual 
military officers have been systematically under pressure to not enrich themselves personally. 
Similarly, the evidence collected in this study overall points to the conclusion that the prevalence and 
scale of the incidents of corruption recounted by the Rwandan interviewees confirm that such 
practices are rather an exception than the rule. Perhaps even more compelling is the evidence of the 
Rwandan government’s  development achievements in key areas such as delivery of public services, 
improvements to infrastructure, and poverty alleviation which are hardly imaginable in a low-income 
country where a significant proportion of public resources are lost to gran corruption. 
In light of the above considerations, this study finds that in terms of its anti-corruption outcomes the 
Rwandan governance regime can be situated closer to the ethical universalism ideal of public resource 
allocation and far removed from the model based on particularism prevalent in most of Sub Saharan 
Africa.  
7.2 Characterising the Rwandan governance regime 
If we agree that Rwanda is indeed an anti-corruption success story, then several questions need 
addressing: What can we learn from the Rwandan experience and how does the RPF-led government 
compare to other cases of high particularism in terms of the prevalence of informal governance 
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practices? What characteristics have enabled the transition from high corruption (particularism) to low 
corruption (universalism)? 
The evidence suggests that the Rwandan case represents a governance model that clearly deviates 
from the African modal type based on clientelism and patronage, but also does not conform to the 
Western ideal of a Weberian state that adheres to ethical universalism and is kept in check according 
to principles of democratic accountability. Rather, Rwanda is closest to the model of the 
developmental state. 
A first and central consideration to make in order to characterise the Rwandan governance model is 
the importance of the rise to power of a political leadership that commanded the military victory 
putting an end to the Genocide, which consisted in its majority of Rwandans who grew up (or spent 
many years) in exile. Therefore, the new political leadership and pertaining cadres were independent 
of those networks of political and economic interest that had previously ruled the country. After an 
initial phase characterised by internal conflicts and depuration of cadres, the leadership of the RPF, 
personalised in the figure of Paul Kagame, has become and remains to date the undisputed centre of 
power in the country. The underlying political settlement involves a narrow winning coalition, referring 
to those groups whose support is indispensable to stay in power, that includes the military. As Bueno 
de Mesquita and Smith (2011) assert, the smaller the winning coalition the fewer people to satisfy to 
remain in control, which relaxes the pressure to divert resources to manage the conflicting interests 
of more extensive (and often unstable) groups of supporters that characterise most competitive 
authoritarian regimes. 
The accentuated centralisation of power around a small group led by Kagame enables a high degree 
of state autonomy to enforce the radical reforms that have transformed the Rwandan public 
administration significantly. 24  This was necessary to realise the RPF’s ambitious programme of 
national reconstruction. However, as many of the endemically corrupt countries in the region and 
beyond illustrate, significant centralisation of power is not a sufficient precondition to promote an anti-
corruption paradigm shift. What appears more likely to be a deciding factor, and what according to 
Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi and Booth (2013) distinguishes the Rwandan regime from the African modal 
pattern, is that the elites have “gambled” on building popular support by improving performance in 
development outcomes and public service provision as opposed to building and nourishing political 
constituencies through practices of patronage and clientelism (see also Chemouni 2016). This gamble 
requires building up an effective state apparatus that can deliver tangible results, which therefore 
entails avoiding pilferage and waste and enforcing controls on the behaviour of public officials. In this 
regard, as one interviewee in a high-level government position strongly asserted, in order to 
understand the regime’s policies, one has to grasp that the “fight against corruption is not an isolated 
thing; it is part of something bigger” (Int.072017.e). 
In this light, the Rwandan case represents a departure from the common African governance model 
based on patronage politics and the prebendal logic of co-optation, which depends on the cultivation 
of complex networks of vested interests that entrap political leaders into protecting and servicing the 
interests of their supporting networks, for the sake of political stability and regime survival (Baez 
Camargo and Sambaiga, 2018; Golooba-Muebi 2018, Baez Camargo and Musila 2018).  
                                                   
24 This is not to discount the presumable impact that advisory groups to the President (such as the Presidential Advisory Council composed 
of 24 reknowned national and international experts) have on Kagame’s long term strategic thinking. 
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The Rwandan case also deviates from the conventional model associated with good governance which 
associates the ability of the state to allocate resources according to universal principles with social 
orders based on individualism and with a political arena where the principles of open contestation and 
pluralism that underpin liberal democracies provide the basis for keeping public authority in check. As 
this report has shown, among the pillars of the ideology espoused by the RPF are the pre-eminence 
given to communitarian unity over individualism and pluralist representation of interests as well as the 
emphasis on consensus over contestation. 
The model of the developmental state, coined after the rise of the newly industrialised TIGER states of 
South East Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) came to challenge the free market-
based prescriptions of the Washington consensus. In those countries, accelerated industrialisation 
was promoted by strongly interventionist states (Wade 1993; Woo 1991; (Kane 2009). This model of 
state capitalism required a combination of high state autonomy and authoritarian practices in order to 
centralise rents and strategically invest in export-oriented industries with strong ties to the state, while 
fending off social pressures in order to maintain low wages (White 1988; Hsiao 1990). As has been 
outlined throughout this report, many of these features can indeed be found in Rwanda, together with 
a strong personalisation of political power, which ‘blend modern bureaucratic and more personal forms 
of authority’ and has led several authors to consider the RPF regime as an example of developmental 
patrimonialism (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012a; Huggins 2017; Biedermann 2016). 
7.3 The 3C’s in Rwanda 
Further adding to the recognition of the Rwandan government’s success in fighting corruption through 
a governance model that grants the state a central role in managing rents, for the purposes of this 
study it becomes central at this point to delve into the extent to which informal practices continue to 
play a role in the Rwandan context. 
One common feature shared with the informal governance regimes that characterise other East African 
countries, is that a strong, dominant figure that centralises power, is behind the management of the 
key power networks in Rwanda. This section will argue that co-optation, control and camouflage 
practices can indeed be found in the Rwandan context but with important differences in nature and 
scope compared to those found in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. There are three main points that will 
be elaborated: 1) one of the main differences is that informal co-optation and control are not prevalent 
in the public sector, 2) in areas relative to non-state actors, informal co-optation and control 
mechanisms can be observed but, whereas in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda the research has identified 
patterns of co-optation and control that happen in a top-down, horizontal and bottom-up manner, in 
Rwanda one finds that the predominant pattern is one of overwhelmingly top-down co-optation and 
control, and 3) strict enforcement rule of law may give rise to new forms of camouflage. 
Within the public sector, evidence of top-down informal co-optation and control is not obvious. Top-
down informal co-optation manifests itself in appointments to allies irrespective of technical 
competence, and recruitment practices based on particularistic criteria that result in patronage 
networks. Impunity of co-opted allies for underperformance and corrupt behaviours is another key 
characteristic of top-down informal co-optation. In Rwanda the evidence suggests that appointment 
criteria tend to emphasise competence while formalised human resource management systems 
promote recruitment based on merit. This conclusion was echoed in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
analysis of cabinet appointments following the 2017 presidential election, which indicated the 
president’s preference for bringing technocrats and experienced bureaucrats on board and concluded 
that “given the president's dominance over Rwanda's political landscape, he does not need to placate 
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rivals with political appointments and can instead focus on choosing individuals who can drive his 
economic agenda.”25 
Furthermore, strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms clearly set goals and expectations of 
performance. They are associated with mechanisms aimed at evaluating outcomes and enforcing 
consequences for underperformance, including the Annual Leadership Retreat and the public events 
where Imihigo results and rankings are announced. Notably, these accountability processes that 
Rwandan government officials undergo are public and transparent and the widespread perception 
among interviewees in this study as well as among other scholars and authors that enforcement of 
sanctions in the Rwandan public sector is stringent. The relevance of this strict application of sanctions 
to public officials for corruption, negligence and underperformance is underscored by a remark made 
by one of the interviewees: “Most African leaders do not have the capacity to fire [but] only to hire” – 
alluding to situations where appointments are made to appease or reward certain constituencies 
(Int.072017.g). The implication is that the enforcement of meritocratic criteria for recruitment and 
sanction enforcement is a measure of political autonomy and of a governance regime that does not 
rely on prebendal co-optation for its survival. 
Within the ruling group, the evidence suggests that the expectations of austerity and regard for the 
law are enforced at the highest levels. Although, this is admittedly a claim that is exceedingly difficult 
to prove, this was a perception that came up repeatedly among interviewees and is echoed by other 
scholars who invoke the military background to explain high levels of discipline and austerity among 
inner circle elites (Campioni and Naack 2012). Yet others explain prevalent discipline as arising out of 
fear of the treatment that political renegades face under the Kagame presidency (Longman 2017). 
Behuria (2016) in turn suggests that the RPF strategy to promoting the establishment of military-
owned enterprises serves the purpose of maintaining political stability, albeit not at the expense of 
allowing personal enrichment of military leaders but rather through the dispersal of rents within a 
centralised hierarchy and because military investment groups as leading economic actors contributes 
to strengthening the position of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) in society. In addition, it is fair to 
stress that the creation of military investment groups was also a strategic decision to stabilising a post 
conflict context as it contributed to the reintegration of thousands of former combatants into civil life.    
Ultimately, an important trait is that a small, cohesive winning coalition means that a very limited 
number of actors need to be co-opted. In turn this would indicate that, even where examples of 
prebendal co-optation among the inner circle existed, the extent and scope of corruption can remain 
constrained, still representing more an exception than the norm, as compared to contexts where the 
winning coalition is larger and more unstable.  
In contrast to the shrinking space for informality in the public sector, the research indicated that top-
down, informal co-optation and control take place in relation to other political groups. As mentioned 
before, according to the 2003 Constitution political competition is open to all those forces who 
renounce ethnic divisionism and Genocide ideologies. Some sources argue that in practice these 
criteria are utilised to remove potentially serious power contenders from formally contesting elective 
office (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018), which would constitute a form of informal control. On the other 
hand, formal opposition parties are in fact accepted because they are friendly to the RPF (or co-opted) 
and pose no serious political alternative. It could furthermore be said that the stated principles that 
provide for the inclusion of the loyal opposition through power sharing and consensus decision-making 
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in fact formalise co-optation into the RPF regime. Such mechanisms ensure these groups remain 
aligned with the ruling party while keeping them close and regulating their activities through the Forum 
of Parties, which are factors that facilitate control.  
The evidence also puts forth that practices of top-down co-optation and control extend to the 
grassroots levels and are relevant vis-à-vis citizens. One obvious co-optation mechanism that compels 
individuals to align with the regime are the civic education initiatives (notably the Ingando and Itorero 
trainings) which co-opt citizens into the RPF ideology. These initiatives not only co-opt but also 
introduce a clear control dimension because the official discourse emphasising unity discourages 
contestation and because there is a lack of an ideological and political alternative to citizen 
participation and mobilisation.  
That being said, an aspect of the civic education efforts of the RPF-led government that is particularly 
relevant to this research concerns attitudinal changes among Rwandan citizens in the sense that 
corruption is increasingly viewed in a negative light. In fact, the emphasis on an official discourse and 
public policies that draw from traditional practices and social norms that invoke the ideal of integrity 
can be understood as way of closing the gap between formal rules and informal practices that is 
conspicuous in other countries where levels of corruption are high. In this regard it can be said that 
top-down co-optation and control of elites and citizens in this instance favours better anti-corruption 
outcomes. 
In other countries horizontal co-optation linking the government officials and the private sector 
involves a situation where political elites develop informal ties with certain business interests that help 
finance election campaigns and other politically motivated activities in exchange for the promotion of 
private interests in the public policy arena. In Rwanda, the ties of the ruling party with influential 
business consortia are formalised by means of direct ownership and a proactive involvement in 
influencing the investment climate. In this sense, co-optation is not horizontal but rather top-down 
since the state exercises its authority to steer those corporations with direct links to the RPF and to 
influence other private sector actors into making investment decisions aimed towards furthering the 
goals of the government. In addition, the success of the RPF business initiatives gives the party the 
revenues it needs to cover its campaigning costs during elections, rendering unnecessary the quest 
to acquire resources through corrupt transactions.  
The final aspect of the discussion on informal governance practices refers to whether practices of 
camouflage are relevant in the Rwandan context. As mentioned before, across the public sector there 
is a high degree of transparency in recruitment, performance monitoring and enforcement of sanctions 
which restrict the opportunities to camouflage informal co-optation and control practices. If anything, 
the Rwandan government is known for demanding a lot from public officials in terms of ambitious 
expectations and targets in pursuit of the government’s development goals. In this respect, a particular 
type of camouflage practices was documented in the research which raises questions about whether 
the tight top-down controls characteristic of the RPF regime might be sustainable in the long run. This 
informal practice, known as “gutekinika”, refers to cases where public servants present modified 
reports or statistics on performance outcomes in order to meet the requirements of the hierarchies 
and to hide poor performance.  For instance, in the education sector, “Gutekinika” often occurs in the 
statistics about school drop-outs since the number of children enrolled at schools determines not only 
the budget received, but also contributes to the imihigo performance goals of local government 
officials (Gatwa and Uwimbabazi 2016). 
Deepening the analysis of informal practices further, the evidence from Rwanda brings up the question 
of whether a different type of camouflage might not be at play. As Purdeková (2011b p. 41) suggests, 
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the analysis of the politics of consensus in Rwanda points on the one hand to the dynamics of 
suppression of voice and certain opinions and, and on the other hand, to the dynamics of co-optation 
into agreement with the result is that dissent is extremely hard to ‘quantify’. This suggests the 
relevance of a kind of camouflage that is not associated with the informal redistribution of public 
resources, as is the case in other East African contexts, but rather one where autocratic rule is 
camouflaged behind a façade of power sharing and consensus decision-making.  
In their analysis of transitions to good governance, Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston have argued that 
political regimes and governance orders are not necessarily tightly linked (2017, 6). Some countries 
that have experienced dramatic improvements in democratic pluralism may nonetheless continue to 
be characterised by particularistic governance regimes. In this case, a transition to a governance order 
that produces positive control of corruption outcomes takes place by means of some less-than-
democratic approaches, as was also the case in Georgia (Kupatadze 2018) and more recently in 
Tanzania (Sambaiga, Koechlin, and Baez-Camargo 2018).  
This situation begs for a reconceptualisation of many preconceived assumptions that are often found 
in the literature on development, governance and anti-corruption, which has drawn extensively from 
findings of large N quantitative research that links all manner of good governance outcomes, 
particularly anti-corruption, to democratic regimes. The reality speak in favour of a more nuanced 
approach and illustrates the need to do away with assumptions of linear development trajectories that 
theories such as modernisation theory have mainstreamed. Based on the evidence, anti-corruption 
practitioners are hard pressed to consider the plausibility of substantive trade-offs among the various 
key political and developmental goals that share priority status in the international agenda. 
The Rwandan case can teach important lessons in this regard. One first insight is that, when it comes 
to those anti-corruption reforms most frequently recommended by donors, the experience under RPF 
rule indeed shows that best practices are effective if there is strong political will to enforce them. 
While it is true that Rwanda has developed some innovative locally grown approaches, such as the 
Home Grown Solutions, as one senior officer expressed during an interview: “What we have done is 
what other people know but don’t do” (Int.072017.d).  
It therefore is not surprising that many accounts of the failure of conventional anticorruption measures 
point the finger to the lack of political will. As the recount of the massive purges that took place during 
the early days after the end of the Genocide illustrate, in Rwanda this political will emerged out of a 
process whereby the ruling elites carved a political space that excluded the emergence of powerful 
corrupt individuals or lobbies who could represent dissenting voices. Thus, the effective exercise of 
political will is linked to a context of high state autonomy that maintains its viability through the 
enforcement of a model of state-society relations that favours conformity and acquiescence in the 
name of unity at the expense of pluralism and contestation. Admittedly, the particular traits observed 
in Rwanda are without a doubt, at least in part, a product of the tragic precedent of the Genocide, 
which justifiably provides a rationale to prioritise effectiveness, reconciliation and unity over 
contestation and dissent. Whether these trade-offs can remain viable in the long run in justifying the 
current dynamics of state-society relations in Rwanda remains an open question.  
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 33 
8 Bibliography 
Baez Camargo, Claudia, Paul Bukuluki, Robert Lugolobi, Cosimo Stahl, and Saba Kassa. 2017. 
“Behavioural Influences on Attitudes towards Petty Corruption. A Study of Social Norms and 
Mental Models in Uganda.” Basel Institute on Governance. 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/studies. 
Baez Camargo, Claudia, Tharcisse Gatwa, Abel Dufikumutiza, Cosimo Stahl, and Saba Kassa. 2017. 
“Behavioural Influences on Attitudes towards Petty Corruption. A Study of Social Norms, 
Automatic Thinkins and Mental Models in Rwanda.” Basel Institute on Governance. 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications. 
Baez Camargo, Claudia, Richard Sambaiga, Egidius Kamanyi, Cosimo Stahl, and Saba Kassa. 2017. 
“Behavioural Influences on Attitudes towards Petty Corruption. A Study of Social Norms and 
Mental Models in Tanzania.” Basel Institute on Governance. 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications. 
Baez-Camargo, Claudia. 2012. “Using Power and Influence Analysis to Address Corruption Risks: The 
Case of the Ugandan Drug Supply Chain.” Chr. Michelsen Institute U4 Brief. 
http://www.u4.no/publications/using-power-and-influence-analysis-to-address-corruption-
risks-the-case-of-the-ugandan-drug-supply-chain/. 
Baez-Camargo, Claudia, and Alena Ledeneva. 2017. “Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption 
Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and 
Tanzania.” The Slavonic and East European Review 95 (1): 49–75. 
https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.95.1.0049. 
Bayart, J-F.1990. La problématique de la démocratie en Afrique noire, Juin, CNRS-CER I. 
Baylis, J., Smith, S., The globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 2005  
Behuria, Pritish. 2014. “Bringing Industrial Policy Back in: A New Flavour to the Narrative of Post-1994 
Rwanda | Democracy in Africa.” Democracy in Africa (blog). April 23, 2014. 
http://democracyinafrica.org/bringing-industrial-policy-back-new-flavour-narrative-post-
1994-rwanda/. 
———. 2016. “Centralising Rents and Dispersing Power While Pursuing Development? Exploring the 
Strategic Uses of Military Firms in Rwanda.” Review of African Political Economy 43 (150): 
630–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2015.1128407. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. “BTI  2018  Country  Report Rwanda.” Gütersloh:   Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Biedermann, Zsuzsánna. 2016. “The Case of Rwanda as a Developmental State.” In Entrepreneurship 
and SME Management Across Africa, edited by L. Achtenhagen and E. Brundin. Frontiers in 
African Business Research. Singapore: Springer. 
Booth, David, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi. 2012a. “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of 
Rwanda.” African Affairs 111 (444): 379–403. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads026. 
Booth, David, and Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi. 2011. “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of 
Rwanda.” Africa Power and Politics Programme, Working Paper 16. http://www.institutions-
africa.org/filestream/20110321-appp-working-paper-16-developmental-patrimonialism-the-
case-of-rwanda-by-david-booth-and-frederick-golooba-mutebi-march-2011. 
———. 2012b. “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda.” African Affairs, 1–25. 
https://doi.org/doi: 10.1093/afraf/ads026. 
Bozzini A (2014), Fighting Corruption while Undermining Accountability. The case of Rwanda. 
ANTICORRP, GIGA background paper [D3.2.11 of February 2014, European Union, Hertie 
School of Governance. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2011. The Dictator’s Handbook. NY: Public Affairs. 
Cabral, Amical (1988) “Class and Revolution in Africa”. In D. McLean, Marxism: Essential Writings, New 
York: OUP, 392-409.  
Campioni, Maddalena, and Patrick Naack. 2012. Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military and 
Reconciliation Prospects. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chemouni, Benjamin. 2016. “The Politics of State Effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda. Ruling Elite 
Legitimacy and the Imperative of State Performance.” London: The London School of 
Economics and Political  Science. 
Clark, Phil. 2014. “Overstating the State: Gacaca, Government Control and Citizen Agency in Rwanda 
| Democracy in Africa.” Democracy in Africa (blog). May 10, 2014. 
http://democracyinafrica.org/overstating-state-gacaca-government-control-citizen-agency-
rwanda/. 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 34 
Cooper-Knock, SJ. 2016. “Rwanda: Liberation by Numbers? | Democracy in Africa.” Democracy in 
Africa (blog). April 5, 2016. http://democracyinafrica.org/rwanda-liberation-by-numbers/. 
David Booth, Linda Calabrese, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi. 2017. “Coordinating Public and Private 
Action for Export Manufacturing: Issues for Rwanda.” London: Overseas Development 
Institute. https://www.odi.org/publications/10857-coordinating-public-and-private-action-
export-manufacturing-issues-rwanda. 
Gatwa T (2001; 2005], Churches and Ethnic ideology in the Rwandan crises 19900-1994. Oxford/ New 
Delhi: OCMS. 
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, and David Booth. 2013. “Bilateral Cooperation and Local Power Dynamics: 
The Case of Rwanda.” London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Golooba-Mutebi, Fredrick. 2018. “Uganda Country Report.” Research report on behalf of research 
project “Informal Governance and Corruption: TRanscending the Principal-Agent and 
Collective Action Paradigms.” 
Golooba-Mutebi, Fredrick, and David Booth. 2013. “Bilateral Cooperation and Local Power Dynamics: 
The Case of Rwanda.” ODI. 
Gourevitch, Philip. 2009. “The Life After.” The New Yorker, April 27, 2009. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/05/04/the-life-after. 
Government of Rwanda (2014), Ministry of infrastructure. Zero fleet policy of government of Rwanda. 
July 2014. 
Hasselskog, Malin. 2016. “Participation or What? Local Experiences and Perceptions of Household 
Performance Contracting in Rwanda.” Forum for Development Studies 43 (2): 177–99. 
Heath, Anthony F., Lindsay Richards, and Nan Dirk de Graaf (2016). Explaining Corruption in the 
Developed World: The Potential of Sociological Approaches, Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2016.42:51-
79.  
Hsiao, H M. 1990. “An East Asian Development Model: Empirical Explorations.” In In Search of an East 
Asian Development Moel, edited by P Berger and H M Hsiao, 12–23. New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers. 
Huggins, Chris. 2017. “Discipline, Governmentality and ‘Developmental Patrimonialism’: Insights from 
Rwanda’s Pyrethrum Sector.” Journal of Agrarian Change 17 (4): 715–32. 
International Crisis Group. 2001. “‘Consensual Democracy’ in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating The 
March 2001 District Elections.” ICG Africa Report No 34. 
Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2018. “Kyrgzstan Country Report. Part 1: Macro Level I.” Research report on 
behalf of research project “Informal Governance and Corruption: TRanscending the Principal-
Agent and Collective Action Paradigms.” 
Kagame Se-Mateka Alexis (1952), Le code des institutions politiques au Rwanda ancien, Brussels: 
IRCB. 
Karamoko Kane (2009), La corruption des fonctionnaires africains. Comment sortir d’un system de 
capitulation générale. Yaoundé	: CLE. 
Kelsall, Tim. 2013. Business, Politics, and the State in Africa. NY: Zed Books. 
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/B/bo20842031.html. 
Kimonyo, Jean-Paul. 2015. “A Strong Man Building Strong Institutions in a Weak Society?” The New 
Times Rwanda. July 8, 2015. http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/190418/. 
KT Press. 2017. “Kagame Speaks on Donald Trump, RPF’s Crystal Ventures and ‘Fake News.’” KT 
PRESS (blog). March 8, 2017. http://ktpress.rw/2017/03/kagame-speaks-on-donald-
trump-rpfs-crystal-ventures-and-fake-news/. 
Longman, Timothy. 2017. Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press. 
Mbaraga, Robert. 2017. “Rwanda Names Corruption Offenders.” The East African, May 20, 2017. 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/Rwanda-names-corruption-
offenders/1433218-3935184-fcmd05z/index.html. 
Mugisha, Ivan. 2016. “Rwanda to Make Public Names of Officials in Corruption Scandals.” The East 
African, March 26, 2016. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/Business/Rwanda-to-
list-names-of-officials-in-corruption-scandals-/1433224-3133942-14gxl9r/index.html. 
Mulindahabi, Charline. 2015. “Obedience Troubled? Exploring Meanings of Obedience in the Post-
Genocide Rwanda.” Gothenburg, Sweden: University of Gothenburg. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/40099. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, and Michael Johnston, eds. 2017. Transitions to Good Governance: Creating 
Virtuous Circles of Anti-Corruption. Cheltenham UK and Northhampton, MA USA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. 2015. “NISR 10 Years of Policy Support. Sustaining Poverty 
Reduction.” Kigali, Rwanda, September 14. 
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/rwanda-poverty-profile-report-results-eicv-4. 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 35 
Purdeková, Andrea. 2011a. “‘Even If I Am Not Here, There Are so Many Eyes’: Surveillance and State 
Reach in Rwanda<a Href="#fnS01">*</A>.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49 (3): 
475–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X11000292. 
———. 2011b. “Rwanda’s Ingando Camps. Liminality and Teh Reproduction of Power.” Refugee Studies 
Centre Oxford Departmen of International Development Working Paper Series No. 80. 
Reyntjens, Filip. 2007. “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising ‘Liberation’ and 
‘Democratisation.’” Third World Quarterly 27 (6): 1103–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590600842399. 
Sambaiga, Richard, and Claudia Baez-Camargo. 2018. “Dismantling Networks of Corruption: 
Challenges and Opportunities in Reforming Informal Governance in Tanzania.” Research report 
on behalf of research project “Informal Governance and Corruption: TRanscending the 
Principal-Agent and Collective Action Paradigms.” 
Scher, Daniel. 2014. “The Promise of Imihigo: Decentralized Service Delivery in Rwanda, 2006-2010.” 
The Promise of Imihigo: Decentralized Service Delivery in Rwanda, 2006-2010, July. 
/publications/promise-imihigo-decentralized-service-delivery-rwanda-2006-2010. 
Sebudubudu, David, Lina Khatib, and Alessandro Bozzini. 2017. “The Atypical Achievers: Botswana, 
Qatar and Rwanda.” In Transitions to Good Governance. Creating Virtuous Circles of Anti-
Corruption, by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Michael Johnston, 31–56. Cheltenham UK and 
Northhampton, MA USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Straus, Scott. 2008. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
The Economist. 2017. “The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Business Empire.” The Economist, March 2, 
2017. https://www.economist.com/news/business/21718000-crystal-ventures-has-
investments-everything-furniture-finance-rwandan-patriotic. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2017. “Kagame Wins Third Term by a Landslide.” August 7, 2017. 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=615760445&Country=Rwanda&topic=Politics
&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Election+watch&u=1&pid=1876400571&oid=187640057
1&uid=1. 
Transparancy International. 2015. “People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 (Afrobarometer).” 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_and_corruption_africa_surv
ey_2015. 
UNDP. 2014. “Millennium Development Goals. Rwanda Final Progress Report: 2013.” 
Versailles, Bruno. 2012. “Budget Strengthening Initiative Country Learning Notes. Rwanda: 
Performance Contracts (Imihigo(.” Overseas Development Institute. 
Wade, Robert. 1993. “Managing Trade: Taiwan and South Korea as Challenges to Economics and 
Political Science.” Comparative Politics 25 (January): 147–67. 
Wendel J [2016] Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity. In Annual Review Law. Soc. Sci. 
2012.8:453-498. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org. School of Public Policy, George Mason 
University, Arlington, Virginia 22201;email: jwedel@gmu.edu 
White, G. 1988. Developmental States in East Asia. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Woo, J E. 1991. Race to the Swift. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
 
